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During the last decade the decrease in the size of 
computing machinery, coupled with the increase in 
their computing power have lend to the development 
of the concept of mobile computing. Effects of this 
new vision can be seen currently in the flourishing 
numbers of mobile telephones and portable com-
puting units. In the current work we investigate 
some issues concerning the security of databases 
and database systems in the mobile computing en-
vironment. We present a scheme for end-to-end 
secure data transfer between one mobile computing 
element to another based on a recent protocol for 
key distribution. Secure data transfer is crucial 
as a foundation to providing other more complex 
interactions between the various mobile computing 
elements. Following this we also present an ex-
tension to the scheme, applicable for the storage 
of data in a mobile database, allowing for remote 
accessibility of the data in a secure manner. 
1 Introduction 
The field of computing has entered a new era with 
the birth of a new area of interest referred to loosely 
as "mobile computing." The concept of mobile 
computing developed from the realization that as 
computing machinery decrease in size and increase 
in computing power users will demand these ma-
chinery to be part of their everyday life, accompa-
nying them in the carrying-out of their everyday 
tasks. Researchers in this new field envisage that 
mobile computing units, such as today's laptops 
and palmtops, in the future will be communicating 
with each other, whilst providing location trans-
parency to the user. This notion of transparency is 
carried-over from that in distributed computing, in 
which the user is unaware of the remote physical 
location of the resources being used by the dis-
tributed computing system. In the case of mobile 
1 The author is also at the Department of Computing 
& Information Systems, University of Western Sydney -
Macarthur, Campbelltown, NSW 2560, Australia 
computing, however, several differences emerge. The 
major difference - and in contrast to distributed 
computing - is precisely the mobility or the non-
fixed positioning of some of the computing elements. 
This difference in itself presen ts various new chal-
lenges to researchers in the field. These challenges 
lie not only in the underlying area of mobile com-
munications, but also in the the area of computing 
strategies and algorithms for non-fixed computing 
units. 
In this work we discuss some issues concern-
ing the security of databases and database sys-
tems in the mobile computing environment. In 
the same way that distributed databases presented 
challenges to the broader area of distributed com-
puting, mobile database poses some new and par-
ticular problems in the wider concept of mobile 
computing. We recognize that security must be 
integrated into the design of new solutions to mo-
bile computing. The second aim of this paper is to 
present a scheme for secure data transfer between 
one mobile computing element to another. This 
ability is crucial as a foundation to providing other 
more complex interactions between the various mo-
bile computing elements. Following this we also 
present an extension to the scheme, applicable for 
the storage of data in a mobile database, allow-
ing for remote accessibility of the data in a secure 
manner. 
In the next section we briefly discuss the back-
ground and motivations of the current work. This 
is followed by a general discussion on some secu-
rity issues in mobile computing, focusing on mo-
bile databases. Section 4 discusses a scheme that 
provides secure end-to-end data transfer between 
mobile computing elements. Section 5 applies the 
scheme to the storage of data in a mobile database, 
concentrating on the accessibility of the stored date 
by remote users. Finally, Section 6 closes the paper 
with some remarks and conclusion. 
2 Background and Motivation 
In order to realize the revolutionary concept of mo-
bile computing, a wireless network architecture is 
required that will support the mobile computing 
environment in the near and distant future, and 
that will accommodate further technological devel-
opments in the area. Such a basic network archi-
tecture has been suggested in [1] (Figure 1). Three 
of its main components are the Mobile Units (MU), 
which are the users and their portable computing 
units; the Mobile Support Stations (MSS) which 
are the stations which maintain communications 
with the mobile units; the Fixed Host which are 
the other nodes connected to the mobile support 
stations. 
A further component is the Location Servers 
(LS) which are employed to maintain data on the 
position and actions of each mobile unit. Hence, 
a given location server holds a database contain-
ing information about a mobile unit registered as 
having a "home-base" in the area or zone managed 
by the location server and data on those "visitors" 
in the area (cell). These location server databases 
are used to manage and operate the mobile wire-
(eg. corporate sales data) and may connect to 
remote fixed hosts, the safe and secure storage of 
the cryptographic parameters that provide access 
to the data is of paramount importance. 
The later of the two related problem can be 
solved using current technology in the form of smart-
cards. Increasingly, smartcards are used for user 
authentication is various non-mobile environments 
and and are recognized to be a suitable medium for 
the storage of a limited amount of cryptographic 
parameters [4, 5]. 
In this paper we turn to the ILM protocol [6, 7] 
in the hope of providing a solution for the first of 
the two problems. The protocol provides a method 
for two parties to commence communications with-
out previously communicating with each other. The 
protocol does away with the need of exchanging 
cryptographic parameters before the parties com-
municate. The problem of the achieving a common 
cryptographic parameter (eg. session key) is shifted 
into that of creating suitable and matching param-
eters which are stored in the users' smartcards, as 
will be discussed in Section 4. 
In the following section we continue to discuss 
other security issues within mobile computing, and 
in particular in mobile database systems. The aim 
of the discussion is illustrate different problems which 
were previously unforeseen, and identify those which 
are immediately relevant in the near future. 
less network [2], and as such, they are not directly 
accessible to the mobile units. The data stored in 
these database are used and inter-exchanged only 
among location servers, and between location servers 
and mobile support stations. The location servers 
typically correspond to mobile switching offices, with 3 
approximately 60 to 100 mobile support stations 
being catered for by one location server [3] In the 
current paper we assume that each mobile unit 
incorporates a multiuser database system which is 
accessible by the owner of the mobile unit and by 
Mobile Databases: Some Security 
Issues 
The nomadic nature of some mobile computing el-
ements have introduced new problems which were 
non-existent in the traditional areas of computing. 
New solutions and solutions derived from tradi-the other (mobile) users from remote sites. 
From the point of security, one immediate prob-
lem becom~s evident in mobile and nomadic com-
puting environment, namely the issue of global user 
identification and authentication. This issue is fur-
ther complicated by the fact that mobile units have 
limited resources which must be used sparingly. 
Hence, overheads due to security which were tol-
erable in traditional fixed distributed systems are 
here required to be minimized or eliminated. With 
respect to security, one of the major sources of over-
heads is the security (cryptographic) parameters 
that need to be exchanged between communicating 
parties before any interactions commence. This re-
quirement of exchanging parameters is also present 
in mobile computing systems and is of major con-
cern for researchers who are developing new crypto-
graphic algorithms for mobile computing systems. 
Coupled with the problem of communications 
overheads is the problem of the management of 
cryptographic parameters, particularly in the mo-
bile unit carried by the user. Bearing in mind 
that mobile units may often carry sensitive data 
tional computing are in demand in order to trans-
form the dreams of mobile computing into a reality. 
In the notable work of [8], four categories for 
future developments in mobile wireless computing 
have been proposed, namely mobility, disconnec-
tion, data access modes and scale of operation. These 
areas present challenges to the traditional approach 
to data management and database systems, which 
until recently have not included effects of mobility 
into their design and applications. In this paper 
we would like to propose security as being the fifth 
category which intersects the first four categories. 
In the following, we briefly discuss some security 
issues within the framework of two of the areas 
specified by [8]. 
3.1 Mobility and Security 
The fact that both users and the data that they 
carry have become a mobile component in comput-
ing has in itself introduced a different set of security 
problems. In the traditional case of fixed (non-
mobile) computing physical protection could easily 
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Figure 1: The Mobile Computing Network (after [1]) 
be afforded by making a computer and database 
system physically isolated from the other compo-
nents in the environment. In such a configuration 
it was possible to make the system self-sufficient, 
without any need to communicate with the external 
world. 
In mobile computing this form of isolation and 
self-sufficiency is difficult to achieve due the rela-
tively limited resources available to a mobile unit, 
thereby necessitating it to communicate with the 
mobile support station. The mobility of users and 
the data that they carry introduces security prob-
lems from the point of view of the existence and 
location of a user (which is deemed to be data in 
themselves) and the secrecy and authenticity of the 
data exchanged between users and between a user 
and a fixed host. 
More specifically, a user on a mobile wireless 
network may choose to have the information con-
cerning his or her existence treated as being con-
fidential. That is, a user may choose to remain 
anonymous to the majority of other users on the 
network, with the exception of a select number 
with whom the user often interacts. This problem 
of user anonymity is related to a more difficult 
problem of the. trust level afforded by each node 
in the network and the problem of the security of 
location data concerning a user when the location 
data is stored or transferred between nodes as the 
user moves in a nomadic fashion. These nodes must 
provide some assurance to the user about his or her 
anonymity, independent of the differing levels of 
trust that may exist for each node. This require-
ment is of particular importance in the case of a 
user that crosses between two zones which are un-
der two nodes respectively, each having a different 
trust level. Equally important is the secure transfer 
of data between databases at nodes which hold 
location data and other information or parameters 
in the user profile. Here all traffic internal to the 
network and transparent to the nomadic user must 
be maintained secure and authentic. 
Other problems include the possible inference 
attacks on the databases and the provision of per-
formance transparency [3] for the nomadic user. 
Thus, as the user roams across zones, the user must 
not experience a degradation in the access and la-
tency times. Again, security must be considered 
in the context of replication, both from the trust 
level of the mobile support stations and fixed hosts 
and from the point of view of data leakage. In 
general, as sensitive data is replicated across several 
sites, the security risks are also increased due to the 
multiplication of the points of attack [9]. 
3.2 Disconnections and Security 
Another major issue in mobile computing which 
arises from mobility and power (battery) restric-
tions is disconnection. Disconnection of a mobile 
unit from a mobile support station is necessary for 
the conservation of power of the mobile unit. A 
mobile unit can typically find itself running on a 
temporary form of power supply (eg. spare bat-
tery) while its main power source is being recovered 
(ie. recharged). In this situation differing levels 
of disconnection may be introduced, ranging from 
the normal connection to connections using low 
bandwidth channels. 
A crucial aspect of disconnection is the elec-
tive or non-elective nature of a disconnection [8]. 
The non-elective disconnection refers to the cases 
when a mobile unit disconnects due to an unfore-
seen event, such as system crashes or total commu-
nications break-down when moving into certain ge-
ographic regions. The elective disconnection refers 
to the planned and desired disconnection on the 
part of the owner of the mobile unit who wishes 
to temporarily limit remote access to his or her 
mobile unit. This type of disconnection typically 
covers instances where power availability is degrad-
ing, where the owner wishes to employ the max-
imum resources (eg. CPU) available for a short 
task, or where the owner simply desires the mobile 
unit to be put into a "sleep" state. In both types of 
disconnections, a number of potential security loop-
holes may be introduced. The transition from one 
level of disconnection to another may present an 
opportunity for an attacker to masquerade either 
the mobile unit or the mobile support station. 
One possible solution to this problem is for the 
mobile unit and the mobile support station to agree 
upon a secret before any transition in the levels of 
elective disconnections. When at a later time the 
mobile unit wishes to upgrade the connection level 
with the mobile support station, both parties can 
start by exchanging the shared secret in a secure 
manner. A good candidate for a solution to this 
problem is zero-knowledge protocols, in which the 
mobile unit and the mobile support station can con-
vince each other that they hold the shared secret 
without having to transmit the full secret [10]. 
will be the foundation upon which other more com-
plex interact~ons will be based. 
4 Secure Data Transfers 
End-to-end security and authenticity between com-
ponents within a mobile computing systems repre-
sents an important foundation upon which other 
operations must be based. The scheme presented 
in the following is based on the Improved Leighton-
Micali (ILM) protocol [6], which establishes a se-
cure end-to-end channel for data transfer 2. 
Following the requirements of [6, 7], we assume 
that tamper-proof VLSI chips are readily available. 
These are incorporated into the computing equip-
ment that handle secure data transfer, such as the 
Mobile Units (MU), the Mobile Support Stations 
(MSS) and the Fixed Hosts (FH) that hold cryp-
tographic information. For simplicity, in the fol-
lowing discussions we will only refer to the MUs 
and the MSSs, although the intent is clear that 
other entities in the network that require secure 
data transfer must have tamper-proof chips (eg. 
memory). Furthermore, we will employ the terms 
"user" and "mobile unit" interchangeably, denoting 
the computing element that is actually mobile or 
non-fixed. We assume that a publicly known one-
way hash function h exists (which may also be 
replaced with a cryptographically strong pseudo-
random function). All data transfer instances are 
assumed to be protected against the replay attacks 
Another potential security problem related to through the use of timestamps, nonces or other 
disconnections is the leaking of information [11, suitable mechanisms. 
12] through the use of inappropriate concurrency In the initialization stage, each user owning a 
control techniques in the database of the mobile mobile unit will be assigned cryptographic param-
unit. Related to this issue is the problem of in- eters by the Trusted Authority in the network. This 
complete transactions caused by elective and non- is achieved through the use of smartcards issued to 
elective disconnections. A number of scenarios present each user and to the administrator at each MSS. 
themselves in this context. Security and integrity The parameters are not accessible to the users or 
problems may occur in the case when hand-offs the administrators, and are used to generate a ses-
occur between two mobile support stations as the sion key for secret and authentic data transfer. Be-
mobile unit crosses zones (cells). Other security fore using the MU a user (administrator) must in-
problem may occur when a mobile unit deposits a sert his or her smartcard into the tamper-proof 
"timed" transaction at a fixed-node, which begins compartment of each MU (MSS) in order for the 
to execute when certain conditions are met (eg. - parameters to be loaded into the secure memory of 
time of day, availability of raw data) and which the MU (MSS) [4]. 
transmits the results back to the nomadic mobile 
unit. These scenarios represent only a few poten- 4.1 RegIstration 
tial security problems among many others in the 
context of levels of disconnections and transaction 
management in mobile databases. 
There is considerable research work to be done 
in the area of mobile computing systems, and in 
particular, in the area of secure mobile databases. 
As the area of research matures, more will be un-
derstood concerning the security of data in mobile 
computing and in the mobile wireless network. In 
the next section we will discuss the issue of how to 
provide a secure channel for data exchange, which 
In the ILM protocol it is assumed that the Trusted 
Au thori ty holds M secret keys (Xl, ... , X M ). Each 
secret key is chosen uniformly at random by the 
Trusted Authority and is of length k-bits. For 
each user i who is enrolled into the system, the 
Trusted Authority assigns an identity Ii and selects 
2The original Leighton-Micali protocol of [6] had an 
inherent flaw which in our context allowed an attacker 
to compromise data when it is in transit. This flaw has 
subsequently been solved and the protocol improved by the 
work in [7]. 
M random integers (01, ... , OM) from the interval 
[1, LJ, where L is an integer. 
The Trusted Authority then employs h to com-
pute Y171 = ham(Xm) for all m = 1, ... , M, where 
hS (X) indicates applying consecutively the func-
tion h on an input X for s times. That is, 
s times .-------... 
hS(X) = he·· h(h( X»·· .). 
Here (01, ... , OM) becomes the public key of user i. 
The corresponding secret key (Y1 , ... , YM) is then 
placed by the Trusted Authority into the tamper-
proof chip of the user's smartcard. The Trusted 
Authority also injects a secret database key Di into 
the chip (its use will be evident in the following 
sections). The smartcard is only delivered to the 
user after the secret key has been inserted, and 
hence no person has access to the secret keys or the 
other secret parameters within that user's tamper-
proof chip. 
4.2 Secure Channels 
When a user i at a mobile unit (MU) desires to 
exchange data with another user j, such as for the 
purpose of retrieving data, the calling user i must 
first establish a secure channel with the controlling 
MSS, and then request the MSS to further create a 
secure channel with the destination MU of user j. 
In the following we will apply the ILM proto-
col to establish a session key between user i and 
the MSS without them previously communicating. 
This session key will be denoted as Si,mss. The 
aim of the scheme is for user i and the MSS to 
arrive independently at keys Ki,mss and Kmss,i, 
where Ki,rnss = Km .. ,i. The scheme is described 
as follows [7], employing Ii as the identity of user i 
and Imss as the identity of the MSS. 
1. The MU of user i must obtain the public key 
(f31, ... , f3M) of the MSS. This public key can 
be resident in a list within each MU or it can 
be read from a publicly readable file at one of 
the MSSs. 
Note that the tamper-proof chip can easily com-
pute hOm(Xm) = hI5m-aml(Ym) (m = 1, ... , M) 
and thus Ki,mu because it has available the values 
Ym = ham(Xm) residing in its internal memory. 
The tamper-proof chip of the MSS then performs 
symmetric procedures, obtaining the key Kmss i, 
which is in fact identical to Ki,mss [7]. ' 
In order to aid our subsequent discussions we 
will simplify Equation (1) into 
Ii :::; Imss , 
Ii> 1m ... 
(2) 
As before, the k-bit value X is chosen randomly 
by the Trusted Authority where k should be suf-
ficiently large, say k ~ 100, in order to prevent it 
from an exhaustive search attack [7]. The value X 
is kept secret by the Trusted Authority, and during 
the enrollment of users the Trusted Authority also 
injects a copy of X into the chip of the smartcard 
belonging to the user and into that belonging to the 
administrator at each MSS and Fixed Host. Hence, 
in fact, the value X is common to all parties in the 
system. 
4.3 Session Keys 
After the user i and the MSS have established a 
secure channel via keys Ki,m .. = Km .. ,i, the MSS 
proceeds to establish another secure channel with 
the MU of the destination user j using the previous 
method. Here, the secure channel between the MSS 
and user j will be via keys K171H,j = Kj,171u 
At this point two general options are available 
for the selection of the session keys. First, the MSS 
can be given the authority to generate two session 
keys, namely key Si,rn .. to be shared between user i 
and the MSS, and key Sm .. ,j to be shared between 
the MSS and user j. Alternatively, each of the users 
can choose randomly and uniformly a key that they 
will share with the MSS. 
The first option, where the MSS has the au-
thority to choose randomly and uniformly the keys 
Sj,mss and Smu,j, is advantageous from the point 
of view of resource consumption at the MUs of 
both users. However, the second option can remain 
2 After user i inserts his or her smart card into . . . attractive if some part of the computation could 
hIS or her MU, the MU must prOVIde the smart- be performed off-line with the MU carrying the 
card wit~ th~ p~blic key of the MSS. The ~amper- partly completed result of the computation. Other 
proof chIp wlthm the smartcard of user ~ then methods such as real-time off-loading to a remote 
computes the common key Ki,m .. as: computation server can also be employed. 
Assuming the first option is adopted, two ap-
proaches are available, namely for the MSS to choose 
two distinct keys Si,rn .. and Sm .. ,j, or for the MSS 
to select one key which it will share with both 
.. ·llh5M (XM )IIIdII171ss), 
.. ·lIhOM(XM)III171ssIlI;), 
Ii :::; I171n , users (ie. S;,m .. = Sm .. ,j). From the point of 
I; > I171ss . (1) view of security, the usage of a single session key 
where 6m = max(om, f3m), m = 1, ... , M, and 
II denotes concatenation. 
across a number of communications segments may 
increase the risk from compromises. In this case, 
the all parties within end-to-end communications 
must have the same level of trust, something which 
is difficult to .assure since the mobile unit may be 
prone to physical attacks as compared to the MSS. 
The use of a distinct session key for each com-
munications segment may also be beneficial from 
the point of view of data transfer between MSSs 
over land-based transmission medium, such as fibre 
optics. More specifically, two MSSs that exchange 
a large amount of traffic may already have a se-
cure channel established between them via a given 
session key. They may then prefer to add (multi-
plexing) new communications instances under the 
existing session key with the other traffic, rather 
than to create d. separate secure channel. 
In addition, this approach has an advantage in 
terms of the control by the MSS over a user's MU 
when the user is not active. That is, when a user 
sets his or her MU to "sleep" mode in which the 
MU can be "awaken" remotely by another MU, 
the MSS can be assigned authority by the user as 
to which other MUs are allowed to "wake-up" the 
user's MU. This delegation of authority from the 
MU to the MSS is a possible solution due to the 
fact that any calling MU must first deal with the 
controlling MSS before interacting any other MU. 
This is of particular importance in cases where the 
user's MU carries a database (eg. sales data) which 
can be interrogated remotely by another user (eg. 
a company executive). 
5 Mobile Storage: Security 
a mobile unit should remain in an encrypted state 
when not in use, since the unit may be subject 
to theft and other mishaps. Due to the need of 
sharing of data with other users, data in the mobile 
database must also be accessible by remote users, 
both when the owner of the unit is running the 
database (ie. concurrent access) and when the unit 
is in "sleep" mode. The limited power supply of a 
mobile unit commands that only a small number of 
remote users should be able to access the database. 
They should also be geared towards retrieving data, 
rather than requesting operations to be performed 
on the portable computing unit. Furthermore, the 
internal battery of the mobile unit should provide a 
signal when its battery power is low, leading to the 
rejection of further access by remote users whilst 
maintaining the correctness and integrity of the 
database. 
One technique that can be used to protect data 
from illegal theft and to provide secure access to 
remote users is by way of encipherment. More 
specifically, each data item (eg. record) Ri is en-
ciphered under a key KR.. Several copies of this 
key are created corresponding to the number of 
remote users that have been registered to access 
the database. For a given remote user j, the key 
/(R. is stored enciphered as {I{R,} K E.,j under the 
key 
r E- . _ { h(XJJDiJJIiJJIj), 
\ ',J - h(XJJDdJIjJJIi), 
Ii :s: I j , 
Ii> Ij . 
(3) 
In this section we briefly discuss a method of stor- where Di is the secret database key uniformly cho-
age for data in the database of a mobile unit (MU), sen by the Trusted Authority and injected into the 
providing for accessibility to other MUs and fixed smartcards of users i and j at registration time. 
hosts (FH). We focus particularly on small databases Here Di is common to all remote users that have 
which are located in MUs with small computing registered to access the mobile database of user i. 
power, such as laptop and palmtop computers. Hence, When an authentic remote user j requests ac-
even though such databases may offer access in the cess to record Ri stored in the mobile database of 
same manner as ordinary DBMSs, we assume that user i, the pair 
the number of users that access the database is lim-
ited and that as far as possible all CPU-consuming 
operations should be performed by the calling party. 
In the future, one cannot rule-out the possibility 
of having larger DBMSs running on MUs with a 
higher level of power. One example would be the 
placement of a permanent computing unit and DBMS 
in a user's vehicle (eg. car) with a larger power 
supply, which is updated periodically by the user's 
smaller computing unit (eg. laptop or palmtop). 
Such a database should then be accessible concur-
rently by a number of remote users in the tradi-
tional sense. 
One important requirement in all databases is 
that the data stored in it should be available to 
only the specified set of authorized users. In the 
situation of a database within a mobile unit, the 
user that carries the unit has practically complete 
control over the accessibility of the data. Data in 
is sent over the air by the mobile unit of user i. 
(Here the symbol "Ox" denotes encipherment us-
ing key K). Upon receiving the pair, the tamper-
proof chip of the remote user j's smartcard -lodged 
inside his or her mobile unit - must generate K Ei,j 
and decipher {/(R,} KEi,j to obtain KRi' It then 
uses KRi to decipher {R;}KR in order to recover 
the plaintext Ri. After this, the chip discards KRi' 
thereby making the value always inaccessible di-
rectly by mobile units other than that belonging to 
user i. 
To reduce traffic on the air from the mobile 
unit of useri carrying the database, an alterna-
tive approach is to store the entries {/(R,}KE.,j for 
each registered user j at the home site of user i. 
Since this information is only decipherable by the 
tamper-proof chip within the mobile units of users 
i and j respectively, it can be safely replicated to 
other sites depending on the location strategy used 
by the network. In this case the entry can then be 
delivered over the air by one of the MSSs, thereby 
reducing the unnecessary power consumption at 
the mobile unit of user i. 
6 Remarks and Conclusion 
There is still a long way for research to proceed 
before mobile computing will become a daily reality 
in society. Although considerable effort is being 
addressed towards research in mobile computing, 
much of it i3 concentrating on the performance and 
availability of mobile computing, with compara-
tively little attention being given to the security 
issues in such an environment. 
In this paper we have proposed security - in 
addition to the existing categories developed in [8] 
- to be a major category for future developments 
in mobile computing. We have discussed briefly 
the issues of security in the context of mobility 
and disconnection, presenting a number of poten-
tial problems in the security of a mobile computing 
environment. 
This was followed by the presentation of a scheme 
for secure data transfers between elements within 
the mobile computing environment, such as mobile 
units and a mobile support stations. The scheme is 
based on the Improved Leighton-Micali (ILM) pro-
tocol [6, 7], providing a means for the establishment 
of a secure channel without the parties needing to 
communicate previously. The basic scheme was 
then applied for the storage of data in a mobile 
database, which allowed for data to be accessible 
to registered remote users at other mobile units or 
other fixed hosts. 
The mobile computing environment and its se-
curity presents a new ground for further research, 
with some problems which are non-existent in the 
traditional non-mobile computing environment. Fu-
ture work on the security of mobile computing and 
mobile databases will concentrate on solving prob-
lems pertaining to the security of information within 
the three sub-areas of the mobile environment: 
• The security of information residing in the mo-
bile units and the correctness and integrity of 
databases in these mobile units. 
• The security of information as it travels "over 
the air" between mobile units and mobile sup-
port stations. An important consideration in 
this area is the power consumption of the algo-
rithmsand schemes that implement this secure 
data transfer. New data storage schemes and 
data organization techniques will be required 
to facilitate rapid searching and transfer of 
data to and from mobile databases. 
• The security of information within the mobile 
wireless network. This includes the security of 
databases holding control data used for the op-
erations and management of the mobile wire-
less network. 
These three sub-areas of research will be crucial if 
mobile computing is to be a reality in the future. 
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